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Abstract
Ce travail analyse la prise de risque des filiales et succursales des banques interna-
tionales, a` partir de l’expe´rience de l’Argentine et l’Uruguay. En particulier, nous analysons
les diffe´rences de la prise de risque entre deux groupes de banques e´trange`res (filiales vs
succursales) avant les grandes crises financie`res survenues en 2001-02, qui a conduit au de-
fault de la dette publique de l’Argentine. La section empirique de cette recherche est base´e
sur une nouvelle base de donne´es sur les bilans individuels, la forme le´gale, ainsi que les
proprie´taires, des institutions financie`res. Nous mettons en e´vidence que les succursales
ont pris moins de risque que les filiales avant les crises financie`res. Ce re´sultat apparait
associe´ aux diffe´rences dans le roˆle d’assurance des maisons me`res, selon le statut le´gal
des socie´te´s dans les pays d’accueil et les conse´quences sur les bilans et la re´putation des
institutions a` niveau global. Notre travail contribue a` e´claire´, d’une part la litte´rature sur
le choix de forme le´gale optimale des banques internationales face au risque dans les pays
d’accueil (macroe´conomique, politique, etc), et d’autre part, sur la re´gulation optimale des
banques centrales de ces pays afin de re´duire la prise de risque des institutions financie`res
et donc l’instabilite´ du syste`me bancaire face aux chocs adverses.
This paper analyzes the risk taking of branches and subsidiaries of international bank
holding institutions from the perspective of host country regulators in two Latin American
financial systems: Argentina and Uruguay. Using both theory and empirics, we analyze
differences in the risk attitudes of these institutions in the run up to the major financial
crises of 2001-02. The empirical part of this paper is based on a rich bank-level dataset on
corporate structures, balance sheets, and ownership of banks. We find that foreign banks’
branches have taken on fewer risks than subsidiaries and relate this to differences in the legal
responsibility of parent banks. This research not only shows original results concerning
banks corporate strategies in the face of country risk, but also contributes to the debate on
appropriate banking regulation.
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remaining errors are our own.
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‡Paris School of Economics and University d’Evry Val d’Essonne, cwinograd@gmail.com
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
The major bank holding companies are nowadays institutions whose operations are dispersed
across a wide range of national jurisdictions. Typically such banks are headquartered in one of
the major advanced economies but they have extensive networks of subsidiaries and branches
through which they operate abroad. The geographical dispersion makes financial systems inter-
connected and generates the potential for international spillovers in good times as in bad times.
The activities of cross-border banking groups can generate trade-offs between gains associated
with higher efficiency through better diversification and costs associated with financial instabil-
ity and contagion. International diversification will also show in differences in country risk in
the banks’ portfolio.
There is no consensus about the advantages of highly diversified international banking sec-
tors compared to purely domestic banking systems. On the one hand, host country regulators
are attracted by the efficiency gains of foreign bank participation stemming from technology
transfers and international networking, but on the other hand, they are concerned with financial
stability and potential spillovers in the case of a home country crisis or financial distress of the
parent bank. Host country regulators are as well concerned with situations in which foreign
banks pursue aggressive and risky growth strategies, or in which their outposts are used as a
’deposit production’ office that collects the funds locally to invest them abroad. Bank holdings
and home country regulators are interested in gains that arise from the scale and diversification
of their international operations. Indeed international bank holdings should be less vulnerable
to adverse idiosyncratic shocks. In less developed financial systems they tend to benefit from a
higher growth potential and gains associated with increasing financial intermediation. They are
themselves however concerned with negative contagion effects in the case of host country crises.
Against these backdrops, this paper analyzes the relative advantages and disadvantages of
branches and subsidiaries of cross-border banking groups from the perspective of host country
regulators in two Latin American financial systems: Argentina and Uruguay. These two case
studies offer interesting insights, because both financial systems have an important participation
of international banks and they have been affected by severe financial crises. The novelty of this
paper is that we analyze foreign bank behavior distinguishing between branches and subsidiaries.
Using both theory and empirics, we analyze differences in the risk attitudes of these institutions
in the run up to the crisis.
We find that foreign banks’ branches have taken on less risk than subsidiaries and relate
this to differences in the legal responsibility of the bank holding: while subsidiaries are legally
independent entities, branches are an integrated part of the parent bank and as such they are co-
insured. The ring-fencing of subsidiaries on the one hand allows parent banks to separate parts
of the risk stemming from their foreign operations. Their recourse is limited to the invested
capital. Indeed, parent banks might refuse to recapitalize a distressed subsidiary, even though
the parent as a whole has enough liquidity to withstand the financial distress of its outpost. In
the case of a branch, the parent bank is liable for all liabilities of the outpost to the extent that
the bank as a whole remains solvent.1
1As Del Negro and Kay (2002) point out, US bank holdings might refuse to rescue a branch if there is a contestable
intervention by the host country government (Section 326 of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
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The empirical literature on international bank holdings typically does not distinguish be-
tween these two types of corporate structures, a notable exception is Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia,
and Martinez Peria (2007).2 One strand of the literature on foreign banks in emerging market
economies investigates their impact on their financial systems. As Gruson and Reisner (2004)
argue, foreign banks tend to strengthen domestic banking systems as they are the source of new
technology that, when adopted by the domestic banking system, serves to enhance the systemic
soundness. Several authors have provided empirical evidence that foreign bank presence tends
to improve competition and the efficiency of the host country banking systems (Clarke, Mar-
tinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003), Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Claessens
and Leaven (2003)), though, the empirical evidence for Latin America is mixed (Levy Yeyati
and Micco (2007) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)). Another strand of literature has pro-
vided evidence that foreign banks tend to increase financial stability in emerging markets (Brei
(2007), Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000), and Peek and Rosengren (2000)). In favor of
this view is the fact that international banks tend to have lower default risks and access to in-
ternational capital due to their global scope and diversification. A country-specific shock in an
emerging market should not be able to endanger their financial health, and the presence of in-
ternational banks could prevent local financial crises. The Argentinean crisis and more recently
the global financial crisis, however, have put these views into question.3
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 we discuss regulatory aspects of subsidiaries
and branches focusing on differences in parent banks’ responsibility. In Section 4 we lay out
a model based on Boot and Schmeits (2000) to highlight differences in risk taking incentives
that arise from imperfect information, costly monitoring and limited liability. Section 5 provides
information on the Argentinean and Uruguayan crises from the perspective of the banking sector.
In Section 6 we test econometrically for differences in the risk attitudes across branches and
subsidiaries, using a rich dataset on the financial statements and corporate structures of foreign
banks in Argentina and Uruguay. Finally Section 7 concludes.
Efficiency Act in the 12 US Code Section 633). Therefore, they may have claimed at the court that the asymmetric
conversion of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities at a lower rate than the actual exchange rate falls into this
category. Although this did not happen, solvent US parent banks might have threatened or refused to recapitalize
their Argentinean branches.
2They investigate the determinants of foreign banks’ choice to operate with a particular of corporate structure
including relative home and host country risks. An important shortcoming of the paper is that the authors iden-
tify branches as banks that are entirely owned by the parent bank based on BankScope information. The problem
is that BankScope has virtually no financial statements of branches, implying that their empirical results apply to
subsidiaries with different degrees of parent participation, rather than to branches and subsidiaries.
3In Argentina and Uruguay, largely foreign-owned banking systems ended up in a financial crash in which several
foreign banks refused to recapitalize their outpost. In Argentina in 2002, four major foreign banks that ranked within
the 20th largest banks abandoned the country: the banks Bersa, Bisel, and Suquı´a controlled by the French Cre´dit
Agricole, and Scotiabank Quilmes controlled by the Canadian bank Nova Scotia. In Uruguay, 3 major foreign banks
have been intervened by the government including the country’s 3rd and 4th largest banks: Comerial owned by a
consortium (Banco General de Negocios (Argentina), Dresdner Bank, Cre´dit Suisse and JP Morgan) and Galicia
controlled by the Argentinean Banco de Galicia.
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2 Regulatory aspects of foreign bank entry
In a world without market imperfections corporate structures would not be important. In the
real world, however, market imperfections that create distortions are common. Besides taxes,
transaction costs and costs of financial distress, there are distortions associated with asymmetric
information between corporate insiders and outsiders (opacity) that create incentive problems
between managers, shareholders, and debt holders. The inability to write complete contracts,
combined with costly monitoring and non-enforceability of contracts, creates the potential for
incentive conflicts.
3 Regulatory aspects of foreign bank entry
Opacity of banks is a major problem in the context of regulation, as it makes the entire banking
system vulnerable to bank runs, contagion, and other forms of systemic risks. If banks were
transparent, the problems of weak banks would not contaminate healthy banks, and banks would
borrow at market rates that reflect their inherent risks. Regulation and supervision would be
less important, as the role could be left to the market. Opacity is a major problem associated
with large international bank holding companies. The international community has fostered the
development of global consolidated regulation and supervision standards (BIS (1983) and BIS
(1992)), however, many questions remain unresolved (BIS (2003)).
As discussed in Tsatsaronis (2008), the lessons from the literature on banking supervision
of international banks can be classified into three groups: the identification of externalities, the
analysis of incentives shaping the behavior of supervisors, and the incentives affecting the be-
havior of the supervised banks. The externalities that arise between home and host country
regulators are due to the fact that neither of the two has a global perspective on the costs asso-
ciated with bank failures (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Sinn (2003)). The externality
arises because home authorities tend to underweight the costs to the host economy from a pos-
sible bank failure while they account fully for the benefits of domestic banks’ profits from their
international operations. Other externalities arise from contagion either in the form of banking
panics in the presence of asymmetric information (Chen (1999)) or interbank exposures in the
presence of market incompleteness (Allen and Gale (2000)). The second set of lessons relates
to how externalities distort policy measures and how policy coordination can overcome these
failures stemming from the asymmetry in the perception of the economic costs of distress that
biases the home country regulator towards a higher degree of risk tolerance. As argued in Tsat-
saronis (2008), the distortion is mainly due to regulatory capture, i.e. the identification of the
regulator with the interests of the regulated banks (Dalen and Olsen (2003)). The third group
of results, to which our paper contributes, analyses incentive distortions that appear on the bank
level arising due to the fact that banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage by allocating their
resources across jurisdictions and by optimizing their internal corporate structure to minimize
their regulatory burden and to maximize expected profits (Boot and Schmeits (2000), Kahn and
Winton (2004), and Calzolari and Loranth (2005)).4
4International banks may also have incentives to shift artificially assets, profits and losses between its entities to
reduce tax payments or to shift low-quality assets to avoid regulatory scrutiny.
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Another major problem in banking regulation is that of moral hazard. Particularly relevant
is the problem of ’risk shifting’ or ’gambling for resurrection’, i.e. to increase the overall risk of
a bank’s portfolio, because part of the downside risk is shared with depositors (or their insurers)
and debt holders, while managers and shareholders benefit in the case of success (see, Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and Kahn and Winton (2004)). The aim of bank regulation is to
limit opacity and moral hazard behavior by setting standards that improve banks’ incentives to
act prudently. Capital and reserve requirements resolve partly the problem of risk shifting, as
banks bear parts of the downside risk from investing in risky assets. As we will discuss, foreign
banks’ corporate structure plays a crucial role in this context.
3.1 Corporate structures of foreign banks
Table 1 describes four common corporate structures of foreign banks: representative offices,
agencies, branches, and subsidiaries. While representative offices and agencies are often limited
to a small field of operations, branches and subsidiaries usually perform the same activities as
their domestic competitors and have in many cases important market shares in loan and deposit
markets. Foreign banks can enter a country also indirectly and take a minority stake in existing
domestic banks or participate in consortium banks. In the present paper we focus on branches
and subsidiaries, as these are the most important corporate forms of foreign banks. The decision
of establishing a subsidiary or branch depends on several factors that require careful consid-
eration, including differences in regulation, taxation and the legal responsibility of the parent
bank.
According to international standards a subsidiary is an independently capitalized, separate
legal entity established under the auspices of the host country law. It has the same legal rights
and obligations of a subsidiary bank owned by a domestic bank (capital, reserve, liquidity and
reporting requirements). The parent bank’s assets are separated and do not back the liabilities
of the subsidiary (separate liability). A branch on the other hand has no liabilities that are in-
dependent of the parent bank (joint liability). They are not separately capitalized, stand-alone
legal entities. Opposed to agencies or representative offices, branches are empowered to under-
take general banking functions such as receiving deposits from host country citizens. In some
countries, however, host-country regulators impose limits on their activities and other (tariff
and non-tariff) barriers that do not apply to subsidiaries and domestic banks (Bhala (1994) and
Gruson and Reisner (2004)).5 The reason is that regulators fear that domestic creditors are not
protected when a branch fails, because assets located in the home country of the parent bank
might not be reached. Subsidiaries are perceived to allow for a better protection, because of
their own capital and distinct assets and liabilities.6
In many Latin American countries, banking systems have undergone important changes
throughout the 1990s, including privatization of largely public-owned banking systems, dereg-
5Table 2 summarizes foreign bank regulations for particular Latin American and major advanced economies.
6With the meltdown of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the early 1990s, the US govern-
ment introduced restrictions on foreign banks’ branches, requiring that foreign banks operate with subsidiaries to
be covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance. Among the advanced economies France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and the UK insure deposits held in branches, while Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden only allow
foreign banks to operate with subsidiaries (see Bhala (1994) and Gruson and Reisner (2004)).
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ulation and liberalization of foreign bank entry (see Gruson and Reisner (2004) for Brazil and
Mexico, and Calomiris and Powell (2000) for Argentina). While in Mexico foreign banks that
seek to take on local deposits have to establish an independently capitalized subsidiary, foreign
banks can choose between a branch and a subsidiary in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (see
Table 2). Branches tend to be subject to the same regulatory requirements as subsidiaries and
domestic banks, opposed to European standards where branches from countries that fulfill the
reciprocity principle are not required to maintain the same regulatory capital as domestic banks,
or to comply with the same supervisory and reporting standards.7
As developed in Dermine (2005) and Bhala (1994), each corporate structure has other po-
tential advantages and disadvantages for parent banks that are not covered by our model. In
favor of a single corporate entity is that it facilitates the exploitation of economies of scale
and corporate efficiency, because banks can run the same business line across countries without
double-reporting at country and business line levels. For corporate clients a single entity has
the advantage that it allows to have a single deposit account, instead of having an account in
each country. Moreover a single corporate entity reduces operational risk associated with the
approval of contracts, since a single jurisdiction is in charge of the bank. When branches are not
subject to capital requirements in host countries, this corporate structure may also avoid costly
transfers of capital across entities.
In favor of a subsidiary is on the other hand that it may help to reduce incentives distortions
related to risk shifting. As Kahn and Winton (2004) demonstrate, a subsidiary structure domi-
nates a branch structure when risk shifting incentives are high. In cases in which home and host
country risks differ, a branch structure may distort incentives because home and host country
loans are mixed together, while a subsidiary allows for separation. The increased opacity of
branches tends to increase risk shifting incentives. Subsidiaries also tend to facilitate supervi-
sion of host country regulators, as they are formally incorporated in the financial system and
subject to the domestic legal and regulatory framework. They may also benefit from differences
in taxation and regulation across countries.8 In favor of a subsidiary structure is also the ease
with which it can be sold in the case of financial distress.
Parent banks have to balance the expected costs and benefits of branches and subsidiaries.
Using a theoretical model based on Boot and Schmeits (2000), we analyze in the following dif-
ferences in parents’ incentives to monitor its foreign establishment. In addition to the mentioned
paper, we investigate the model implications not only from perspective of parent banks, but also
from the perspective of host country regulators.
7See Table 2, Boesch (2007) for Switzerland and Gruson and Reisner (2004) for the EU.
8An interesting issue in the context of the global financial crisis has been highlighted by Buiter (2008). Unlike
foreign branches, foreign subsidiaries tend to have access to the discount windows of their host central banks and are
eligible counterparties in the repos and other open market operations. In 2008, several subsidiaries of UK banks made
use of ECB and Fed liquidity facilities, a Swiss subsidiary accessed the Fed’s discount window, and some Icelandic
banks used their EU subsidiaries to obtain euro liquidity.
4 THEORETICAL MODEL ON MONITORING INCENTIVES 7
4 Theoretical model on monitoring incentives
There are three periods t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2. In period t = 0, an international bank A
that is headquartered in a given home country can set up either a branch B or a subsidiary S in
a host country. The parent bank has a franchise value (discounted future profits) of FA, while
the foreign outpost is worth a fraction 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 of its parent bank with a franchise value
Fi = θFA, i = B,S. We assume that franchise values cannot be collateralized in debt contracts
or used for debt payments.
In period t = 1, funds are raised and invested in home and host country loans. Credit
markets are competitive so that lenders earn zero expected profits. For its domestic operations,
the parent bank raises 1 unit of funds at home, while a fraction 0 < κ < 1 of funds is raised
abroad to finance its foreign operations. The parameter κ captures the relative size of funding
needs abroad. While the home loan portfolio is assumed to be riskless, the host country portfolio
is risky and the bank might be unable to repay the borrowed funds.
In t = 2, home country loans offer a high return Xh with probability p > 1/2 and a low
return 1 + V (m) ≤ Xl < Xh with probability 1 − p. In the good state, the investment of
κ funds in the host country portfolio generates a return of κY, Y > 1 with a probability of
q(m) = γ + (1− γ)m, 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Parent banks might invest in the monitoring of its foreign
entity 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, which increases the probability of the good state, however, at a convex cost
of V (m).9 Although the function q(m) is publicly observable, lenders observe monitoring only
partially depending on market transparency 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In the bad state, host country loans have
a return of zero with probability 1 − q(m). Home and host country returns are assumed to be
uncorrelated.
When asset returns are not sufficient to cover debt payments in t = 2, the entity has to default
and franchise values are lost. The assumptions imply that host country returns are not sufficient
to cover debt payments of the subsidiary with probability 1 − q(m). In this state, we assume
that the parent bank is not willing to bail out its foreign entity and the subsidiary has to default.
In the case of a branch, we make the following assumptions: (1) whenever the home country
portfolio is in the good state, returns are sufficient to cover debt payments and there is no default
(co-insurance); (2) when both the home and host country portfolios are in the bad state, the bank
concern has to default and looses the joint franchise value FA + FB (contagion); and (3) when
the parent bank is in the bad state and the branch in the good state, there is no default.10 To sum
up, the default probability of the parent bank is zero if it operates on a stand-alone basis, while
the subsidiary defaults with probability 1− q(m). If the parent operates with a branch structure,
the joint concern defaults with probability (1− p)(1− q(m)).
As mentioned, the market for bank funding is perfectly competitive and lenders observe the
monitoring choice only partially, depending on market transparency α. In particular, we assume
that the funding rate per unit of funds can be decomposed as follows:
Ri(m,α) = αRi(m) + (1− α)Ri, i = A,S. (1)
9We assume that the parent bank has full control over the monitoring intensity and abstract from differences in
incentives distortions within the bank group that may arise across corporate structures.
10It could be argued that the contagion to the parent is only possible above a critical size of the branch. However,
this assumption would not change the qualitative results of our model.
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The first part depends on default probabilities, i.e. when markets are perfectly transparent,
lenders charge the inverse of a bank’s success probability (implied by the assumption of zero ex-
pected profits). When markets are intransparent and monitoring choices are undetected, lenders
charge an exogenous funding rate Ri ≥ 1 that is independent of monitoring.
4.1 The subsidiary structure
In this case, the parent bank and its outpost operate as separate legal entities and there is no
recourse against the parent bank if the subsidiary defaults. As mentioned, the parent bank might
monitor its subsidiary at a cost. The parent bank maximizes therefore expected profits net of
monitoring costs:
max
m
ΠP +ΠS(m) = pXh + (1− p)Xl −RP + FA (2)
+ q(m)(κY − κRS(m,α) + FS)− V (m)
s.t. RS(m,α) = α
1
q(m)
+ (1− α)RS .
Since the parent bank is capable to repay its debt obligations in both states, lenders charge a
funding rate of RP = 1. Note that when markets are partially transparent the funding rate of
the subsidiary decreases with monitoring, since it increases the probability of repayment. The
associated first-order condition is:
V ′(m) = q′(m)(κY − κRS(m,α) + FS)− q(m)κ
∂RS(m,α)
∂m
. (3)
It states that marginal monitoring costs equal the marginal change in expected profits implied
by the marginal change in the success probability, and a marginal change in expected funding
costs implied by the change in the funding rate. For the numerical simulations, we assume
that monitoring costs are a quadratic function V (m) = m2. Given the functional assumptions,
optimal monitoring of the subsidiary equals to:
m∗S =
1− γ
2
(κY + FS − (1− α)κRS). (4)
Optimal monitoring increases with asset returns Y and the franchise value FS = θFA and
it decreases in exogenous funding costs RS . An important implication is that parents invest
more in monitoring when subsidiaries are large. Both higher returns and lower funding costs
increase expected profits, while a higher franchise value increases default losses. In these cases,
the parent bank incentives to monitor improve. Moreover, optimal monitoring increases with
market transparency α, as it reduces information asymmetry on the funding market improving
incentives. Note that the parent bank underinvests in monitoring relative to the socially efficient
solution, when markets are partially transparent.11
11The socially efficient solution would be obtained, when the subsidiary had to finance its portfolio with its own
resources. In this case it would maximize q(m)(κY + FS) − V (m) and optimal monitoring would be m˜∗S =
(1/2)(1− γ)(κY + FS) > m
∗
S .
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4.2 The branch structure
In the case of a branch, the parent bank and its outpost operate as a joint legal entity. As such
the banking group is financed jointly and the parent bank solves the following maximization
problem:
max
m
ΠA(m) = pXh + (1− p)Xl + q(m)κY (5)
− [1− (1− p)(1− q(m))][(1 + κ)RA(m,α) + FA + FB]− V (m)
s.t. RA(m,α) = α
1
1− (1− p)(1− q(m))
+ (1− α)RA,
where RA(m,α) is the joint funding rate. There are three important differences to the subsidiary
structure. First, the joint bank pays a higher funding rate than the parent bank on a stand-alone
basis, but it faces a lower funding rate than the subsidiary, given a level of monitoring and the
same exogenous funding costs RA = RS . The reason is that default probabilities differ: the
parent bank has a default probability of zero in the stand-alone case; the joint bank defaults with
probability (1 − p)(1 − q(m)) (which is close to zero if the parent bank has a high success
probability); and the subsidiary defaults with probability 1 − q(m). Overall the joint bank
pays a lower funding rate, if (1 + κ)RA(m,α) < κRS(m,α) + 1, which depends on both the
relative funding size κ and the funding rate. Second, while the parent bank never risks losing
its franchise value when it operates with a subsidiary, there is a positive probability of losing
its franchise value when it operates with a branch. This tends to improve the parent bank’s
incentives to monitor. And finally, the pooled funding rate is less sensitive to monitoring in the
joint entity, than in the case of a subsidiary, i.e. |∂RA(m,α)/∂m| < |∂RS(m,α)/∂m|, which
tends to worsen incentives within the branch structure.
The associated first-order condition is given by:
V ′(m) = q′(m)κY − (1− p)q′(m)(1 + κ)RA(m,α) (6)
+ (1− p)q′(m)(FA + FB)− [1− (1− p)(1− q(m))](1 + κ)
∂RA(m,α)
∂m
.
In the optimum, marginal monitoring costs equal the sum of the marginal change in expected
profits and funding costs implied by a change in the success probability, the change in expected
default costs, and the marginal change in expected funding costs implied by a change in the
funding rate.
Differences in incentives across branches and subsidiaries can be discussed best when the
first-order condition of the bank within a branch structure is restated as follows:
V ′(m) = q′(m)
(
κY − κRS(m,α) + FS
)
− q(m)κ
∂RS(m,α)
∂m
(7)
+ q′(m)
(
κ
(
RS(m,α)−RA(m,α)
)
− (1− p)RA(m,α)
)
+ q(m)κ
∂RS(m,α)
∂m
−
(
1− (1− p)(1− q(m))
)
(1 + κ)
∂RA(m,α)
∂m
+ q′(m)
(
(1− p)FA − pFB
)
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The first line is the optimality condition of the subsidiary. The branch structure gives rise for
three additional effects:
1. A diversification/funding costs effect represented by the second line. Depending on the
safety of the parent bank’s portfolio at home (high p), there is a positive diversification
effect stemming from lower funding costs within a branch structure. This effect induces
higher monitoring relative to a subsidiary and increases with the relative funding size κ.
When the parent bank’s home portfolio is more risky (low p) it might be more profitable to
operate on a stand-alone basis and a separate subsidiary as the joint funding costs within a
branch (1 + κ)RA(m,α) are more likely to exceed the sum of the separate funding costs
1 + κRS(m,α).
2. A transparency effect, represented by the third line, that arises from differences in the
sensitivity of the funding rates to changes in monitoring. If markets were intransparent,
this effect would be zero, since the funding rates would be exogenous. Assume the (neg-
ative) sensitivities were equal across the subsidiary and branch structure. In this case a
branch structure would support higher monitoring, because a marginal increase in moni-
toring would decrease expected funding costs by more than within a subsidiary structure,
since the survival probability is higher and more funds are raised at that rate. However the
safer the parent’s portfolio, the less sensitive is the funding rate to changes in monitoring,
which gives rise to a reduction in market discipline, and this distorts incentives within the
branch structure.
3. A co-insurance/contagion effect, represented by the fourth line, that depends on franchise
values. If there were no franchise values to loose, this effect would be zero. If a default
implies that franchise values are lost, there is a positive and a negative incentive effect.
On the one hand higher monitoring in a branch decreases the probability that the parent
bank is contaminated by financial difficulties of the branch, which happens whenever
both portfolios are in the bad state. However, there is a negative incentive effect stemming
from the fact that the branch is co-insured whenever the parent is in the good state. This
distorts incentives to monitor the branch relative to the subsidiary. When the parent bank’s
portfolio is safe (high p), the negative incentive effect dominates.
Finally, the functional assumptions on q(m) and V (m) imply the following optimal moni-
toring intensity for a branch:
m∗A =
1− γ
2
(κY + (1− p)(FA + FB)− (1− p)(1− α)(1 + κ)RA). (8)
As in the case of a subsidiary, monitoring intensity increases with higher returns Y , higher
franchise values Fi, lower exogenous funding costs RA, and higher market transparency α. If
θ = κ, optimal monitoring increases with the relative size as long as Y + (1 − p)(FA − (1 −
α)RA) > 0.
Below these incentive effects will be quantified for different parameter calibrations in order
to determine which effect dominates as a function of the relative size of the outpost.
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4.3 Parent bank versus the host country regulator
The parent bank prefers to operate with a branch structure, when implied expected profits are
higher than the sum of expected profits of the subsidiary and those of the parent bank on a
stand-alone basis:
ΠA(m
∗
A)− (ΠS(m
∗
S) + ΠP ) > 0. (9)
The host country regulator is concerned with default probabilities of the outpost, preferring
a branch to a subsidiary, whenever its default probability is lower:12
(1− q(m∗S))− (1− p)(1− q(m
∗
A)) > 0 (10)
If the home country regulator is concerned with the default probability of the parent bank, it
prefers a subsidiary structure since it ring-fences the parent bank from problems in the outpost.
However there might be problems of regulatory capture in which the home regulator’s prefer-
ences coincide with those of the regulated banks. In this case the objective function would in
addition include expected profits of the parent bank.
Since there does not exist a closed form solution for the parent bank’s objective function, we
make use of numerical simulations for different parameter assumptions.
4.4 Numerical results
In the following we examine which corporate form is preferred by parent banks and host country
regulators for varying relative sizes of parent banks and their outposts 0 ≤ θ = κ ≤ 0.5
in various scenarios. In addition we quantify the importance of each incentive effect across
branches and subsidiaries highlighted in eq.( 7). Apart from a baseline calibration, we consider
three alternative scenarios that differ in relative home and host country risks and franchise values.
The parameter values are shown in the Table below.13
Xh Xl p Y γ α RS = RA FA
Baseline 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.7 0.6 0.9 1.02 2
Other scenarios 0.5 0.5 5
Note that expected returns in the baseline scenario are E(X) = 2.1 at home and E(Y ) =
1.02 + 0.68m abroad. The parent’s and host country regulator’s preferences that the determine
their preferred corporate structure are shown in Figure 1. While the regulator prefers in all
cases branches to subsidiaries due to their lower default probability, the parent bank prefers less
monitored subsidiaries, when the foreign entity is small (p/(1 − p) is the threshold). When
the foreign entity is large, the parent bank tends to prefer to operate within a branch structure.
The intuition is that a large subsidiary involves substantial costly monitoring, because expected
default costs are high. When home country risks are high, the parent bank prefers for all relative
12The objective function of the local regulator might also include other arguments that account for the fact that it
prefers larger foreign entities to smaller ones.
13In the three additional scenarios only one parameter changes, each one is shown in the row labeled ’Other
scenarios’, while the other parameters are fixed as in the baseline scenario.
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sizes to operate with a subsidiary. As can be seen in Figure 2 for the baseline calibration, optimal
monitoring of a relatively large subsidiary exceeds that of a branch, since in the latter case the
parent can save on monitoring implied by the branch’s co-insurance.
There is therefore a conflict of interests when the foreign entity is small, because parents
prefer to operate with riskier subsidiaries, while host country regulators prefer that foreign banks
operate with branches. This situation seems to reflect the situation when a large international
bank sets up a foreign establishment in an emerging market, that is, the foreign establishment
is small relative to the parent.14 The host country regulator might subsidize foreign banks that
open up branches in his country.15
We quantify the importance of the converse incentive effects highlighted in eq.( 7), by com-
paring the contribution of each effect on differences in optimal monitoring across branches and
subsidiaries for the baseline scenario. Figure 2 shows the results. A subsidiary supports higher
monitoring above a critical relative size. When the foreign entity is small, the parent bank
prefers to operate with a risky (less monitored) subsidiary, since there is not much to lose in
the case of default. With increasing relative size, the expected default costs of a subsidiary in-
crease and it is optimal to monitor the subsidiary intensively. A branch benefits more and more
from the co-insurance and the negative incentive effects associated with the transparency and
co-insurance/contagion effects dominate.
Overall, the numerical exercise suggests that foreign banks tend to have lower default proba-
bilities, when they operate with branches, although the difference decreases with the relative size
of the outpost. It appears that a host country regulator tends to prefer branches, even when they
are less monitored than subsidiaries. A parent bank on the other hand prefers subsidiaries when
the outpost is small and branches when the outpost is large. In both cases, optimal monitoring
itensities increase with the relative size of the outpost.
5 Common shocks and vulnerabilities, different responses
5.1 Prior to the financial turmoil
From the macroeconomic perspective, a series of external shocks hit the economies in the years
following the Asian crisis of 1997 that resulted in protracted recessions starting in 1999.16 First,
the Asian crisis in combination with the Russian sovereign debt crisis caused in Latin America
important deteriorations in external financial conditions. It became increasingly difficult to ser-
vice and rollover external stocks of debt particularly for public sectors. The subsequent Brazilian
devaluation of 1999 and the appreciation of the US dollar to which both currencies were tied led
to important currency overvaluations vis-a-vis their main trading partners and export competi-
14As discussed below, the average ratio of parents’ total assets over total assets of their outposts is close to 1% in
Argentina and Uruguay.
15Loranth and Morrison (2003) propose that regulators should attribute capital requirement discounts to branches
relative to subsidiaries. This is actually not the case in Latin America, since branches and subsidiaries are subject to
the same set of regulations (Table 2). Similarly, reserve requirements on deposits or other regulatory requirements
might be relaxed for branches.
16See, amongst others, De la Torre, Levy-Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002) for Argentina and De la Plaza and Sirtaine
(2005) for Uruguay.
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tors. In combination with the decline in Brazilian demand, this translated into falling export
demand. Fiscal space to counteract the economic slowdown has been limited resulting from
procyclical and excessive fiscal spending. Prior to the crises of 2001/02, public deficits were
high coupled with relatively high levels of public debt reaching 65% of GDP in Argentina and
58% in Uruguay.
From the perspective of the banking sector, many banks have been subject to common struc-
tural weaknesses prior to the crises. As can be seen in Figure 3, private and interbank lending
was largely dollar-denominated reaching 82% of total lending in Argentina and 86% in Uruguay
at end-2001. Out of these dollar-denominated loans, more than 90% have been granted to resi-
dents in Argentina compared to close to 60% in Uruguay where an important part of the dollar-
denominated loans has been granted to non-residents (mainly to the neighboring countries). On
the liability side, banks have mostly relied on dollar-denominated deposits and interbank funds
reaching 74% of total funding in Argentina and 91% in Uruguay. While 20% of these funds
have been borrowed from non-residents in Argentina, about 45% originated abroad in Uruguay.
Therefore, the major risk has not been a currency mismatch on bank balance sheets per se, since
banks matched largely the currency composition of their assets and liabilities. Rather banks
have been subject to an ’implicit currency risk’ in the sense that many residents (local-income
borrowers) would have been rendered unable to repay their loans in the case of a major devalua-
tion. In addition, Uruguay has been more vulnerable to external shocks given its relatively large
exposure to non-residents on both sides of the balance sheets.17
5.2 Loss of confidence and crisis response
In the run up to the crises, both banking sectors faced a series of system-wide deposit with-
drawals, see Figure 4. These ’bank runs’ have been a result of a loss of confidence in both the
banking system and in the government.
In Argentina, three waves of large deposit withdrawals occurred in 2001. A number of
factors contributed to this loss of confidence including the government’s inability to finance
its deficits and debt, rumors about the end of convertibility, and the ’voluntary’ debt swap of
November (Barajas, Basco, Juan-Ramon, and Quarracino (2007) and Llach (2004)). The bank-
ing system suffered (increasingly systemic) deposit withdrawals of 6%, 10% and 9% of deposits
during March, July to August, and October to December. At the same time, the central bank
lost about 50% of its international reserves as residents started converting pesos into dollars. To
halt the run on the financial system and the pressure on the peso, the government implemented
in December the corralito.18 Confronted with important resilience, the government resigned in
the same month and the interim government declared default on its external debt, the end of
convertibility, and the pesification of domestic debt contracts (pesification-cum-float).19 These
17It is important to note that non-resident loans/funds also include lending/borrowing with the headquarter, which
might be a more (or less) stable investment/source of funds depending on the financial situation of the bank holding.
18The corralito imposed restrictions on the free disposition of cash funds in sight accounts of all banks (independent
of whether a bank was sound or not). Although depositors were allowed to use their funds within the country to make
payments via debit cards, checks and interbank transfers, many depositors withdrew their cash up to the maximal
amount of 250 pesos per week.
19See amongst others Klein (2004) and De la Torre, Levy-Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002).
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steps triggered another run on the economy’s securities to which the government responded by
the imposition of banking holidays in January. During a few months the peso depreciated from
the parity with the US dollar to nearly 4 peso per dollar before partly recovering.
The Uruguayan banking sector benefited initially from the Argentinean crisis, as Argen-
tinean residents were shifting deposits to Uruguay. The positive contagion however turned
negative with the imposition of the corralito in December 2001 (Figure 4). At the beginning,
deposit withdrawals were confined to banks with exposures to Argentina (mainly Galicia and
Comercial).20 Over time however deposit withdrawals became increasingly systemic caused by
increased uncertainty about both banks’ balance sheets and the policy response.21 The banking
system lost 9% and 12% of deposits during January-March and May. Initially, the central bank
provided liquidity support to banks in distress, as the crisis deepened however authorities re-
stricted liquidity support to ’core’ banks. A bank rescue fund FFSB (Fondo para la Fortificacion
del Sistema Bancario) was put in place supported by the IMF and other multilateral institutions.
The deposit withdrawals however continued and the FFSB proved insufficient to calm down
markets. Between December 2001 and June 2002, central bank reserves dropped by approxi-
mately 80%. Confronted with this situation, the government abandoned the crawling band at
the end of June. The peso depreciated immediately by more than 30%. In July the bank run
intensified and authorities imposed banking holidays.
5.3 The aftermath of the financial turmoil
Both crises hit the financial systems with a significant negative impact on banks’ solvency and
liquidity position. In addition to the deposit run and corralito in Argentina, the corralon (manda-
tory restructuring of peso and dollar time deposits in sight accounts) caused a further loss of
confidence and deposit withdrawals continued in 2002. The asymmetric pesification of dollar
loans (1 dollar=1 peso) and deposits (1 dollar=1.4 pesos) implied a negative impact on banks’
balance sheets for which the government compensated banks with government bonds (BODEN
2007 and 2012).22 Another step to stop the outflow of deposits involved the offer to exchange
the rescheduled deposits for newly issued government bonds (Canje I and II). Faced with im-
portant asset write downs caused by the devaluation, drop in domestic asset prices, and increase
in non-performing loans, many banks were forced to recapitalize.23 Having regained the func-
tion of a Lender of Last Resort, the central bank provided rediscounts to troubled banks condi-
tioned on the participation of shareholders and foreign banks’ headquarters. As mentioned in
the beginning, the headquarters of four major subsidiaries (Bersa, Bisel, Suquia, and Scotiabank
20See De la Plaza and Sirtaine (2005).
21It seems that depositors feared that the authorities will adopt similar measures as the system-wide corralito.
Moreover the government’s unwillingness to bail-out Banco Galicia in February 2002 sent another wrong signal to
the market.
22Depositors however that did not accept the pesification and rescheduling of deposits went to the court to claim
for their right to receive their money in the original currency. Many successful injunctions (medidas cautelares)
required banks to release these deposits in dollars, or its equivalent in pesos, at the free exchange rate. This caused a
non-compensated gap between the 1.4 factor at which dollar deposits were converted into pesos and the free exchange
rate that reached up to 4 pesos per dollar.
23To prevent the insolvency of the banking sector, the government allowed that losses can be amortized gradually
over 60 months.
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Quilmes) refused to recapitalize their outposts which had to be intervened by the government.24
The Italian Intesa also decided to reduce its exposures to Argentina and reached an agreement
with Banco Patagonia to take control of its subsidiary Banco Sudameris, however, Intesa BCI
retained 20% of equity.
With the imposition of banking holidays and the announcements of the closure and restruc-
turing of 5 insolvent banks (Hipotecario, Montevideo, Comercial, Caja Obrera, and Credito),
the resolution of the problems in the public bank BROU, and the guarantee of sight deposits
backed by a 1.6 billion dollar loan from multilaterals, depositors’ confidence in the other banks
increased and withdrawals came to an end. The devaluation affected banks through a combi-
nation of adverse balance sheet effects, increase in non-performing loans, and drop in domestic
asset prices. As a consequence, several banks had to be recapitalized. While most foreign banks’
headquarters provided sufficient funds to their outposts, three subsidiaries had to be intervened
(Comercial, Caja Obrera, and Credito). The public banks BROU and Hipotecario have been
restructured with support from the World Bank and the IMF, while the other banks have been
restructured into the newly created public bank Nuevo Banco Comercial that started operations
in March 2003.
6 Risk taking of branches and subsidiaries
In this section we provide empirical evidence on differences in the risk attitudes of foreign
banks’ branches and subsidiaries and their crisis response. In the first part we compare a number
of indicators on market shares and average asset and liability positions. In the second part we
test econometrically for differences in risk taking prior to the crises controlling for bank-specific
characteristics and aggregate economic conditions.
6.1 The data
The data cover on a monthly basis the period 01/1995-12/2004 for Argentina and 01/1998-
12/2004 for Uruguay. The data have been provided by the Central Bank of Argentina and the
Central Bank of Uruguay. Overall there are 8285 (bank-month) observations for 205 banks
from Argentina and 1225 observations for 29 banks from Uruguay. The information on banks’
balance sheets allow to decompose assets and liabilities by currency (domestic and foreign),
nationality (residents and non-residents), and sector (private, public and financial). In addition
we have legal information on ownership (private domestic, public, and foreign). If a bank is
foreign-owned there is a distinction between branches and subsidiaries. It also allows to track
changes in ownership and corporate form over time.
24The headquarter of Scotiabank Quilmes refused to provide sufficient funds in response to a bank run in April
2002 leading to its suspension. In the resolution, most assets and liabilities have been tranferred to Banco Comafi and
Banco Bansud-Macro. Similar happened to the subsidiaries Bersa, Bisel, and Suquia controlled by Credit Agricole
which have been taken over by the public bank Banco de la Nacion in May 2002. In 2004, Banco de la Nacion started
selling these banks back to the private sector.
6 RISK TAKING OF BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES 16
6.2 Summary statistics
Figure 5 shows by ownership the number of banks that operated in the two banking sectors over
time. The Argentinean banking sector has gone through an important process of consolidation.
In the period from 1995 to 2001, the number of private (domestic) banks has declined from more
than 100 institutions to less than 40. The largest drop in the number of private banks has been
associated with the spillover from the Tequila crisis during which a relatively important deposit
run occurred. About 30 institutions have been closed at that time (1/3 of the banks have been
liquidated while 2/3 have been merged, see Calomiris and Powell (2000)). While the number
of foreign banks increased about 30 to close to 40, there was a declining trend in public bank
participation. The Uruguayan banking sector consisted prior to the crisis of the 2 large public
banks (BROU and Hipotecario), 1 private bank (Montevideo), and 19 foreign-owned banks.
Both crises had a negative impact on foreign bank participation, which is mostly attributed to a
decrease in the number of subsidiaries (lower panels of Figure 5). Individual mergers, sales, or
public interventions that involved branches or subsidiaries are reported in Table 3 for the period
1998-2003. Overall, 20 foreign banks (12 subsidiaries and 8 branches) have been sold in the
two countries during this period of slow growth, while 8 foreign banks (8 subsidiaries) had to be
intervened by the governments during the crisis resolution.
In terms of market shares the picture is more striking. The upper panel of Figure 6 shows
market shares for private deposits of foreign, private and public banks, and the lower panel shows
market shares of branches and subsidiaries. In Argentina, the market share of foreign banks
increased from 22% of the banking sector’s deposits to 51% at end-2001. The major increase in
the market share has been most pronounced in 1997 when BBVA, HSBC and Scotiabank opened
up their subsidiaries by the acquisition of three large private domestic banks. In Uruguay, foreign
banks’ market share has been stable at around 60% prior to February 2002. It appears that the
two banking sectors have been highly international prior to the crisis with important foreign bank
participation. The second largest players have been public banks with market shares of close to
35%. Prior to the corralito and pesification at end-2001, the market shares of foreign-owned
banks increased slightly in both countries (flight-to-quality), before falling persistently below
the market share of public banks. The lower panels of Figure 6 highlight that this trend is largely
explained by a drop in the market share of subsidiaries which has fallen by 10 percentage points
in Argentina and 30 percentage points in Uruguay by end-2002. The shift from subsidiaries’
market share to public banks is explained by the suspension of the 8 subsidiaries, mentioned
above, and their subsequent restructuring into public banks. Compared to this, the market share
of branches remained at 14% in Argentina and increased slightly in Uruguay from 19 to 21%.25
Tables 4 and 5 show summary statistics on balance sheets for Argentina and Uruguay distin-
guishing between private and public banks, and foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries.
At end-2001, there operated 80 banks in Argentina among which 33 have been foreign-
owned (14 branches and 19 subsidiaries). In terms of assets, foreign banks made up 46% of
the banking system of which 2/3 can be attributed to subsidiaries and 1/3 to branches. Over
the period 1995-2001, subsidiaries invested a higher fraction of their assets in loans to the non-
25The development in Uruguay cannot be attributed to a different impact of the devaluation on the stock of deposits,
since the shares of dollar deposits have been similar across branches and subsidiaries (see lower panel of Figure 6).
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financial sector (48% of assets) compared to branches (40%), which have been more active on
the interbank market. Both subsidiaries and branches lent out most of their funds to residents
(97% and 94% of lending, respectively) of which the major part has been denominated in a
foreign currency (71% and 65% of lending). This points to the crucial role of foreign banks in
the provision of domestic credits prior to the crisis. The average non-performing loan ratio made
up 10% of lending in the case of subsidiaries compared to 7% in the case of branches. On the
liability side the picture is similar to the asset side, branches relied relatively more on interbank
market funds than subsidiaries (46% and 34% of assets, respectively), while subsidiaries relied
more on deposits from the non-financial sector (51% of assets compared to 42% for branches).
The Uruguayan banking sector consisted of 22 banks out of which 19 have been foreign-
owned (12 subsidiaries and 7 branches). In terms of assets, foreign banks made up 60% of the
banking system of which 2/3 have been owned by subsidiaries and 1/3 by branches. Over the
period 1998-2001, 92% of the external funding of branches and subsidiaries has been denom-
inated in a foreign-currency. Interesting is the important role played by non-resident funding
which amounts to 61% of funding for branches and 51% for subsidiaries. Funds borrowed from
the headquarter represent only a small part of non-resident funding (6% of funding for branches
and 1% for subsidiaries). On the asset side, branches lent out relatively more on the interbank
market than subsidiaries (36% and 27% of assets, respectively) and less to the non-financial
sector (41% of assets compared to 46% for subsidiaries). On average, 92% of lending have
been denominated in a foreign currency. Interestingly, the resident share of lending is much
higher than the resident share of funding, especially in the case of branches with 39% of funds
borrowed from residents compared to 64% of loans that are granted to residents. The average
non-performing loan ratio made up 1.2% of lending in the case of subsidiaries, compared to
0.8% for branches.
Overall the summary statistics suggest that foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries have
been important market participants in the Argentinean and Uruguayan banking sectors. It ap-
pears that they are as active as domestic banks in the financial intermediation business for the
domestic economy. In both countries branches are relatively more active on the domestic inter-
bank market than subsidiaries, but the major part of their business represents the collection of
local deposits (to a smaller extent in Uruguay) and the provision of local loans. Both crises have
been preceded by a surge in foreign bank participation and followed by important reductions
in the market share of foreign banks. As highlighted, these trends are mainly explained by the
expansion and contraction of subsidiaries’ activities.
6.3 Risk taking before the crisis
The empirical evidence so far has not controlled for other bank-specific factors, such as the finan-
cial structure or the business model, and aggregate conditions that influence banks’ decisions.
To account for this, we test for differences in the risk taking across branches and subsidiaries
using dynamic panel regressions. The empirical framework takes the following form:
yit = α+ βyit−p + δD
B
it + φZit−j + γtXt + uit, (11)
where i = 1, ..., N refers to individual foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries and t = 1, ..., Ti
to the time dimension (the panel is unbalanced). The dependent variable is our measure of risk
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taking (measured by the non-performing loan ratio), α a constant term, p the lag of the autore-
gressive part, DBit a branch dummy, Zit−j is a vector of bank-specific characteristics at time t−j
(bank size, capital, liquidity, currency mismatch, non-resident exposure and subordinated debt,
see below for a discussion), Xt are time-fixed effects. To allow for differences in coefficients
and accounting standards across the two countries, and to have a comparative dimension, we
estimate the regression for each country individually. Since we would like to measure banks’
risk attitudes during normal times, the regressions are estimated for the period before the crises
(01/1995-12/2001 for Argentina and 01/1998-06/2002 for Uruguay).
Following Salas and Saurina (2002) and Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2011), we use as a
measure for risk taking the non-performing loan ratio defined by non-performing loans over
total loans. We tested the non-performing loan ratio for stationarity using the Phillips-Perron
test for unbalanced panel data, because particularly in Uruguay there has been an increasing
trend in the non-performing loan ratio over time. For Uruguay, we cannot reject the null that all
panels contain a unit root, using the inverse normal statistic, and we therefore estimate the model
in first differences. In the case of Argentina on the other hand the model is estimated in levels.
As discussed in Salas and Saurina (2002) it is difficult to model non-performing loans on the
bank-level, because they tend to be closely related to previous periods since they are not written
down immediately. Moreover finding the adequate lag structure is crucial as loans might become
non-performing only after several years. It is therefore crucial to experiment with different lag
structures both of the autoregressive part and the bank-specific variables.
The bank-specific explanatory variables include a branch dummy DBit that is equal to 1 when
bank i operates as a branch at time t and zero if it operates with a subsidiary. The associated
coefficient δ captures differences in risk taking across branches and subsidiaries after control-
ling for time-invariant unobserved bank characteristics captured by the fixed or random effects,
unobserved time-dependent characteristics captured by the lagged values of the dependent vari-
able, aggregate conditions, and the other time-varying bank-specific characteristics. We expect
this sign to be negative, that is, branches have taken on less risk as implied by our theoretical
model: small branches of large parent banks are better monitored than subsidiaries of similar
size.26 As discussed before, this can be attributed to the fact that parent banks are fully liable
for the liabilities of their branches, opposed to subsidiaries that are ring-fenced and prone to risk
taking when they are relatively small.
The bank-specific control variables in vector Zit include bank size (measured by the loga-
rithm of assets), capital (equity over total assets), liquidity (cash and other highly liquid assets
over total assets), FX loans to residents (foreign-currency loans granted to residents over total
assets), loans to non-residents (loans granted to non-residents over total assets), interbank loans
(interbank lending over total assets), and subordinated debt (subordinated debt over assets). Ta-
ble 4 provides a description of these variables. For the estimations, the bank-specific variables
have been demeaned to obtain results that can be interpreted for the average bank (in which case
the demeaned variables are all equal to zero).
The expected signs of the coefficients are briefly discussed. Regarding bank size, the the-
26Indeed the relative size of branches and subsidiaries in these countries is on average close to 1 percent of the
parents’ assets, particularly for those banks that are headquartered in North America, Asia and Europe (based on a
subset of banks for which obtained parent bank information from BankScope).
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oretical model discussed above predicted that larger foreign banks tend to be subject to higher
monitoring because default costs increase. This implication holds in the case of both branches
and subsidiaries. The model does however not allow to take into account all factors that shape
banks’ risk taking incentives. Larger banks also tend to be in a better position to diversify risks
and to absorb sector-specific shocks compared to small banks.27 These factors tend to improve
risk taking incentives as well, since they increase banks’ franchise values and default costs. On
the other hand, there are costs associated with bank size. Large and interconnected banking
institutions tend to be more opaque than small banks, and the local management’s or foreign
headquarter’s ability to monitor properly the bank’s operations tends to decrease with bank size
(Cerasi and Daltung (2000)). Due to the increasing likelihood of negative contagion from large
failing outposts to parent banks, there might also arise incentive distortions in the outpost re-
lated to coinsurance and implicit bailout guarantees.28 The mentioned effects go in opposite
directions and it is an empirical question to determine the sign of the coefficient.
Another group of control variables, i.e. capital, subordinated debt, and liquid assets, focuses
on the broader asset and liability structure of bank balance sheets. Higher capital is less likely to
be associated with higher risk taking as it strengthens incentives to monitor by increasing default
costs (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and Mehran and Thakor (2011)).29 Risk taking
however tends to increase if a bank’s survival probability implied by the high level of capital
becomes too large and inelastic with respect to its risk choices (Calem and Robb (1999)). The
relationship between capital and risk is therefore as well undetermined. As a second indicator on
the composition of the liability side, we include subordinated debt which might be a measure of
higher transparence as this type of debt is more difficult to issue externally. Similar to capital, it
is subject to a higher responsibility during financial distress than other external types of debts. A
higher fraction of subordinated debt would therefore tend to improve incentives. A higher stock
of liquid assets might be a sign of banks’ unwillingness to grant credit in a risky environment
or be used as a precautionary cushion to meet obligations that are coming due. However, their
return is typically low which might generate an incentive to search for yield (Altunbas, Gamba-
corta, and Marques-Ibanez (2010)). The expected sign of liquidity is therefore undetermined as
well.
Finally, we control for characteristics of banks’ loan portfolios that might help explain-
ing differences in non-performing loan ratios across banks. In particular, we include foreign-
currency loans granted to residents, loans granted to non-residents, and interbank lending. The
signs of the coefficients have to be determined empirically, as there are again opposite effects
on risk taking incentives. High foreign-currency lending to residents might be an indication of
a higher exposure to the domestic export sector. Prior to the crises, when both currencies were
overvalued, exporting firms have been in a difficult position and possibly subject to higher de-
fault probabilities, especially following the Brazilian devaluation of 1999. On the other hand,
exporters were more likely to benefit from a possible devaluation. If the foreign-currency lend-
27Many theoretical models predict economies of scale in intermediation linked to diversification (Allen (1990),
Diamond (1984), and Williamson (1986)).
28There exists empirical evidence that, although large banks benefit from a diversification advantage, they do not
translate this into less risk taking and follow riskier strategies with lower capital ratios (Demsetz and Strahan (1997)).
29In the notion of the theoretical model discussed above, higher capital could be thought of as a higher franchise
value or higher relative size.
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ing however has been directed to residents with local income, higher values might point to riskier
banks which transferred the currency risk to borrowers.30 High non-resident lending is associ-
ated with more risk when banks lend out to countries in which they have limited expertise, but
geographically more diversified portfolios tend to be associated with less risk. Finally, interbank
loans tend to have lower default probabilities than loans to individuals in normal times. During
financial distress and in the run up to the crises, these loans have been particularly dangerous.
We use two estimation methods: the random-effects GLS estimator and the Instrumental
Variable (2SLS) estimator. The choice for random effects in the case of GLS is based on the
Hausman test which indicates that coefficients are not systematically different across random-
and fixed effects. Given the dynamic setting of the panel regression we estimate the model as
well using the 2SLS estimator which instruments the lagged dependent variables with deeper
lags of the regression variables to avoid a possible endogeneity bias. As will be discussed later,
the main results are unaffected by the choice of the estimator. To determine the autoregressive
order, we estimated the regressions for different lag structures and sets of variables. The choice
of the final model has been done by means of significance tests, explanatory power, and the
robustness to the inclusion/exclusion of regression variables.
6.3.1 Econometric results
We first estimate a baseline specification (i) in which the non-performing loan ratio of branches
and subsidiaries depends on lagged non-performing loans, a constant term, the random effects,
the branch dummy, bank size and year-fixed effects. For Argentina it turned out that non-
performing loans are best modeled by a dynamic part with a lag of 12 months, while in Uruguay
- where non-performing loans are modeled by first-differences - a lag of 1 month turned out
to fit best the stochastic properties of non-performing loans.31 Following Salas and Saurina
(2002), we lagged the explanatory variables by one lag more than the autoregressive part to
avoid spurious correlation. In a second specification (ii), we include the remaining variables in
the regressions.
The estimation results for Argentina are shown in Table 7 and those for Uruguay in Table 8.
In both countries, non-performing loans are significantly positively autocorrelated which con-
firms the dynamic specification. The results for the baseline specification, shown in columns
1 and 2, indicate that both the branch dummy and bank size are negatively related to bank
risk, although the coefficient associated with bank size is statistically not different from zero in
Uruguay. However, once the other bank-specific variables are included, as shown in columns
3 and 4, bank size gets also significant in Uruguay (at the 10% (GLS) and 20% level (IV)).
The constant term is significant and positive across the two countries indicating that the aver-
age bank had a non-performing loan ratio that is significantly different from zero. Across all
specifications and estimators, the average branch had a significantly lower non-performing loan
ratio. In Argentina, the associated coefficient ranges from -0.72 to -3.51 percentage points of the
non-performing loan ratio and in Uruguay from -0.20 to -0.39 percentage points of the change
30Given the high fractions of foreign-currency lending in both countries and the relatively small export sectors
(especially in Argentina), it is more likely that the second effect dominates.
31The main results hold across the most plausible lag structures for non-performing loans.
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in non-performing loans.
The negative size effect indicates that larger foreign outposts, independent of the corporate
form, have taken on less risk, which is in line with the predictions of our model and the franchise
value hypothesis of the banking literature. Higher capital ratios have a significant and negative
impact on risk taking in both countries. In Uruguay it is the most important explanatory variables
apart from the branch dummy and bank size. It appears that we can confirm the hypothesis on
the disciplinary role of capital based on the argument that higher capital increases default costs.
The remaining coefficients associated with the bank-specific characteristics are insignificant in
Uruguay but they are robust across the GLS and IV estimators.
In Argentina, two other important determinates of non-performing loans appear significant
across both estimators: interbank lending and subordinated debt. Both have a negative im-
pact indicating that interbank lending has been less risky and confirming that banks with higher
fractions of subordinated debt have taken on less risk. Finally, there is evidence for negative
relationships between risk taking, liquidity, and foreign-currency lending to residents in the case
of the IV estimator. Higher liquidity seems therefore to be an indication of less risk taking which
would confirm the hypothesis that more prudent banks hold more liquid assets, while the search
for yield argument seems to play a minor role. The evidence that foreign-currency lending to res-
idents is associated with lower levels of non-performing loans compared to domestic-currency
lending to residents might point to the fact that these loans have been more likely targeted to
larger enterprises and wealthy individuals which tend to have lower default probabilities than
smaller and poorer individuals.
Overall the regression results confirm largely our hypotheses after controlling for other im-
portant determinants of non-performing loans. Branches have been less risky than subsidiaries,
the same is true for large versus small foreign outposts, independent of the corporate struc-
ture. Moreover it appears that banks with higher capital ratios have taken on fewer risks in both
countries. In the next section, we perform some robustness checks and include in addition two
proxies: (1) for the relative size of parent banks and outposts (measured by the origin of the
headquarter), and (2) for parent banks’ commitment to its outpost (measured by the fact whether
the headquarter and the outpost share the same name). Moreover we include interactions of the
branch dummy with the origin of the headquarter and with bank size.
6.3.2 Robustness checks
In this section we perform some robustness checks by including additional information in the
regressions. Two variables on parent bank information are introduced: 32 (1) bank origin (a
dummy variable that is equal to one when the headquarter originates from a major advanced
economy and zero otherwise), and (2) bank name (a dummy variable that is equal to one when
the outpost shares the name with the headquarter and zero otherwise). In addition, we include
two interaction terms with the branch dummy, one with bank size, the other with bank origin.
Bank origin can be taken as a proxy for the relative size of the outpost, as the bank hold-
ings that are headquartered in a major advanced economy are typically large relative to their
32We experimented as well with information on parent banks using BankScope. There is however only information
on a limited number of parent banks, especially, on those from advanced economies. This would introduce a sample
selection bias and we prefer therefore not to include these results in this section.
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outposts in Argentina and Uruguay.33 We also include an interaction of bank origin with the
branch dummy, since our theoretical model implied that relatively small subsidiaries are espe-
cially prone to risk taking since they are ring-fenced and default costs are low. We expect the
coefficient of the interaction term to be negative, that is, relatively small branches have taken
on less risk than subsidiaries of similar size. The coefficient associated with bank origin itself
is however undetermined. On the one hand, a headquarter from a major advanced economy
might have better risk management techniques, access to international capital and a wealthier
clientele, and more experience in international banking, while on the other hand there is also
more room for incentive distortions associated with the co-insurance of very small establish-
ments (the free-riding argument). Bank name can be taken as a measure for the commitment
of headquarters for their outpost. Sharing the name with the parent bank increases transparency
and negative reputation effects in the case of a failure of the outpost. The sign of the coeffi-
cient is expected to be negative, as higher transparency is associated with higher monitoring, as
implied by our model. In this case we do not include an interaction with the branch dummy
because most branches have the headquarter’s name.34 Regarding the interaction term of the
branch dummy with bank size, the theoretical model predicted that the difference in risk taking
between branches and subsidiaries decreases with size, as the default costs of larger subsidiaries
increase substantially, while larger branches are subject to increasing incentive distortions as-
sociated with the co-insurance benefits. The sign of the coefficient is therefore expected to be
positive.
Based on specification (ii), we estimate three specifications for each country: (iii) we include
in addition bank origin and bank name; (iv) in addition to specification (iii), we include the inter-
action dummy branch-dummy bank origin; and (v) in addition to specification (iv), we include
the interaction dummy branch-bank size. The estimation results for the two countries based on
the IV estimator are reported in Table 9. In both countries, it appears that bank origin plays an
important role in explaining risk taking. While in Uruguay banks that were headquartered in
major advanced economies reported significantly lower non-performing loan ratios independent
of the corporate structure, this is only true in Argentina in the case of branches. In particular,
once the interaction dummy branch-dummy bank origin is introduced in Argentina, the branch
dummy itself get insignificant and it appears that only (relatively small) branches that are head-
quartered in advanced economies have taken on fewer risks than subsidiaries of similar size.
Bank name and the interaction dummy branch-bank size are both insignificant. Therefore, al-
though bank size is an important (negative) determinant of risk taking, we do not find evidence
that there is a difference of this channel across corporate structures.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines whether there have been differences in risk taking strategies of foreign
banks in Argentina and Uruguay, whether their corporate legal structure was that of branches
33We checked for about 60% of the foreign banks in our sample the relative size of the outpost using BankScope.
In all cases the average relative size has been less than 1% in terms of assets.
34Actually there is only one branch in Uruguay that does not share the name of its parent: BEAL owned by the
German WestLB.
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or subsidiaries. The empirical analysis developed is based on a novel dataset that accounts for
detailed monthly bank balance sheets for the period before the deep financial crises of these two
countries in the early 2000s. We also developed a theoretical model that helps explaining the
differences in risk taking incentives across these two corporate structures from the perspective
of parent banks and host country regulators.
The theory suggests that host country regulators and parent banks may face a conflict of
objectives. When international banks set up relatively small entities in more volatile countries,
local regulators prefer that they set up co-insured branches, because their default probability
tends to be lower than that of subsidiaries. On the opposite, parent banks prefer to operate with
ring-fenced, legally independent subsidiaries. Because larger entities are better monitored by
parent banks than smaller entities, local regulators tend to prefer foreign bank entries of larger
institutions rather than entries of small entities.
The empirical analyses developed in this paper employs a rich bank-level dataset on the
corporate structures of foreign banks and their balance sheets for Argentina and Uruguay, both
economies with banking systems that show a significant participation of international institu-
tions. The empirical evidence suggests that branches have taken on fewer risks than subsidiaries
before the crises. The results also point to the fact that larger foreign banks’ establishments have
taken on fewer risks than small ones, independent of the corporate structure. Moreover we find
that banks that were headquartered in more developed financial systems have generally taken on
fewer risks (in Argentina only in the case of branches). And finally, we have provided evidence
that branches have been less likely to scale down or shoot down their operations in response to
the crises.
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Table 1: Foreign banks’ most common corporate structures
• A subsidiary is an independently capitalized, separate legal entity established under the
supervision and rules of the host country regulator.a A subsidiary has the same legal rights
and obligations as a home country bank. A foreign bank can establish a subsidiary either
by acquiring an existing bank or by creating a new subsidiary de novo. The assets of the
parent bank do not back the liabilities of subsidiaries. Protectionist countries may oblige
foreign banks to establish subsidiaries by legal restrictions.
• In contrast to a subsidiary, a branch has no assets that are independent of the foreign
parent bank. They are not separately capitalized, stand-alone legal entities. A branch is
empowered to receive deposits, grant loans, and to generally undertake banking functions,
opposed to agencies or representative offices. Host-country regulations may impose limits
on their activities that do not apply to subsidiaries and domestic banks.b
• Similar to a branch, an agency is part of the foreign parent bank; however, it cannot take
deposits from host country residents. The main sources of funding are funds from the
parent bank, interbank market funds, or other money market transactions such as short-
term certificates of deposit or repurchase agreements. Agencies are attractive forms of
organization for banks interested in wholesale banking. They can make loans, pay checks,
and maintain credit balances.
• Similar to a branch and agency and unlike a subsidiary, a representative office is part
of the parent bank and not a separately capitalized, distinct legal entity. By regulation,
it cannot perform any of the core banking functions such as taking deposits, maintaining
credit balances, granting loans, or providing payments services. Representative offices are
often established either to provide services to customers based in the home country of the
parent bank or to explore market entries.
• Finally foreign banks can participate in consortium banks with other banks. This type
of foreign bank entry is often used to explore foreign markets. The parent bank is not
responsible for the liabilities of this bank and is only involved as a shareholder.
aParticular host country regulations may deviate from this summary. The summary here is based on modern
banking principles in advanced economies.
bAs discussed in the text, most regulators from Latin America impose the same capital and liquidity requirements
for branches and subsidiaries.
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Table 2: Foreign bank regulation across countries
Entry Capital Liquidity Reserves Deposit Supervision
restrictions requirements requirements requirements protection and reporting
Argentina
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Uruguay
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brazil
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches High Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mexico
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches Very high Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Germany
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches (EU) License required No Yes Yes Depends on Consolidated
home coverage
Branches (non-EU) License required Depends Yes Yes Yes Depends
United Kingdom
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches (EU) License required No Yes Yes ? Consolidated
Branches (non-EU) License required Depends Yes Yes ? Depends
United States
Subsidiaries License required Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branches License required Depends Yes Yes No Depends
a
The overview is based on Gruson and Reisner (2004). For the cases of Argentina and Uruguay we obtained information from
Alejandra Anastasi, Central Bank of Argentina, and Manuel Gonza´lez Rocco, Central Bank of Uruguay. ’Yes’ indicates that the same
rules apply to the foreign banks as to domestic banks. Note that the Brazilian regulation does not impose any mandatory liquidity
requirements for all banks. In the case of German deposit protection of EU branches, the ’topping-up principle’ applies: if the home
country deposit guarantee scheme is more generous than the German scheme, branches can offer the home country scheme. Note also
that supervision and reporting in the advance economies depends on the ’reciprocity principle’.
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Table 3: Changes in foreign bank participation
Bank name Date of Legal Obs.a TA bil.
event form pesos
Argentina
Banco Santander SA 10/1998 subsidiary c 2.85
Bank of New York 01/1999 subsidiary b 0.10
Citicorp Banco de Inversion SA 02/1999 subsidiary b 0.06
Banco Real SA 09/1999 branch b 0.09
Banco Transandino SA (Mercobank) 05/2000 subsidiary b 0.25
Republic National Bank of New York 06/2000 branch b 1.98
Banco Tornquist SA (Santander) 06/2000 subsidiary b 1.34
Banco Sudameris (Caja N de Ahorro) 09/2000 branch b 1.68
Banco Exterior de America SA 04/2001 branch b 0.10
Chase Manhatten Bank NA (Chemical Bank) 11/2001 branch c 3.30
Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo SA 02/2002 branch b 0.04
Kookmin Bank Sucursal BS.AS. 06/2002 branch b 0.06
Banco Suquı´a (Nacio´n) 06/2002 subsidiary a 2.34
Banco de entre Rios SA, Bersa (Nacio´n) 06/2002 subsidiary a 0.81
Banco Bisel SA (Nacio´n) 06/2002 subsidiary a 2.75
Scotiabank Quilmes SA (Comafi, Macro) 09/2002 subsidiary a 4.06
Providian Bank SA (Meridian) 07/2003 subsidiary b 0.29
Banco Bansud SA (Macro) 12/2003 subsidiary b 3.45
Uruguay
Eurobanco 05/1998 subsidiary b 1.08
Banco Pan de Azucar (Caja Obrera) 12/1998 subsidiary c 3.53
Banco Real (ABN Amro) 08/1999 subsidiary b 2.85
ING Bank (Comercial) 09/2000 subsidiary b 5.64
Banco Exterior (BBVA) 10/2000 subsidiary b 3.13
Banco do Brasil 06/2001 branch b 2.03
Banco Galicia 02/2002 subsidiary a 36.45
Banco la Caja Obrera (Nuevo Comercial) 08/2002 subsidiary a 7.08
Banco Comercial (Nuevo Comercial) 08/2002 subsidiary a 32.05
Banco de Credito 08/2002 subsidiary a 13.15
Banco Europeo para Am. Lat. 12/2002 branch b 1.01
Amercian Express Bank 10/2003 subsidiary b 1.36
BNL 12/2003 subsidiary b 4.27
a The table considers only foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries. Entries of foreign banks are not
reported. Note that ’a’ indicates a takeover (or suspension) by the government, ’b’ an acquisition by
another bank, and ’c’ a merger. When available, the name of the acquirer is indicated in parentheses. ’TA
bil. pesos’ indicates banks’ total assets in billions of national currency.
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Table 4: Description of the dataset: Argentina
Private Public Sub- Branches All
banks banks sidiaries banks
General statistics
Number of banks, end-2001 34 13 19 14 80
Number of banks, 1995-2001 122 34 28 21 205
Observations 4313 1429 1147 1396 8285
Sums of volumes at end-2001, billion Pesos
Total assets 25.36 39.34 37.85 18.58 121.13
Percent of total assets 20.94 32.48 31.25 15.34 100.00
Private and interbank lending 19.85 28.93 28.42 13.68 90.88
Percent of lending 21.85 31.82 31.27 15.05 100.00
Private and interbank funding 19.42 33.83 31.90 15.61 100.76
Percent of funding 19.27 33.57 31.66 15.49 100.00
Equity 5.08 4.48 4.14 2.17 15.87
Percent of equity 32.01 28.23 26.09 13.67 100.00
Ratios for 01/1995-12/2001, in percent of assets
Cash 7.60∗∗∗ 8.26 7.17∗∗∗ 4.42 7.09
Public bonds 8.36∗∗∗ 9.73 8.85∗∗∗ 11.25 9.45
Private lending (1) 49.99∗∗∗ 51.94 48.39∗∗∗ 40.44 48.40
Interbank lending (2) 24.33∗∗∗ 18.07 28.06∗∗∗ 38.73 26.05
(1)+(2) in foreign currency 66.40∗∗∗ 70.16 70.69∗∗∗ 64.84 68.38
(1)+(2) to residents 91.60∗∗∗ 95.26 96.57∗∗∗ 93.72 94.41
(1)+(2) non-performing 11.72∗∗∗ 22.90 9.59∗∗∗ 7.13 13.31
Other assets 9.75∗∗∗ 12.00 7.82∗∗∗ 5.17 9.02
Private deposits (3) 52.80∗∗∗ 60.47 51.64∗∗∗ 41.65 51.41
Interbank funds (4) 31.17∗∗∗ 23.34 35.98∗∗∗ 46.03 32.78
(3)+(4) in foreign currency 68.70∗∗∗ 59.25 73.42∗∗∗ 67.39 66.68
(3)+(4) from residents 77.68∗∗∗ 87.38 82.55∗∗∗ 83.96 82.99
Other liabilities 2.41∗∗∗ 3.12 3.03∗∗∗ 2.50 2.81
Equity 13.58∗∗∗ 13.95 9.39∗∗∗ 7.81 11.53
a The sample period goes from 01/1995 to 12/2001 and includes 205 banks and 8285 observations. The
numbers for end-2001 are sums over all (or particular) banks and in billions of national currency. The
balance sheet ratios are weighted averages (by total assets). These averages have been tested on
difference across (1) private and public banks, and (2) branches and subsidiaries using linear regressions.
(∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance on the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Table 5: Description of the dataset: Uruguay
Private Public Sub- Branches All
banks banks sidiaries banks
General statistics
Number of banks, end-2001 1 2 12 7 22
Number of banks, total 1 3 17 9 30
Observations 55 110 682 378 1225
Sums of volumes at end-2001, billion Pesos
Total assets 11.00 110.12 126.58 55.70 303.37
Percent of total assets 3.63 36.29 41.72 18.36 100.00
Private and interbank lending 8.33 49.57 100.83 43.41 202.14
Percent of loans 4.12 35.56 49.88 21.48 100.00
Private and interbank funding 9.48 95.06 113.47 49.34 267.35
Percent of deposits 3.55 35.56 42.44 18.46 100.00
Equity 0.98 10.02 7.21 2.92 21.13
Percent of equity 4.64 47.42 34.12 13.82 100.00
Ratios for 01/1998-12/2001, in percent of assets
Cash 8.11 8.52 5.73∗∗∗ 7.05 7.24
Public bonds 5.50 4.39 8.44∗∗∗ 6.83 6.33
Private lending (1) 50.79 47.05 46.32∗∗∗ 41.11 45.90
Interbank lending (2) 26.92∗∗∗ 10.52 26.53∗∗∗ 35.89 21.41
(1)+(2) in foreign currency 89.26∗∗∗ 51.28 92.07∗∗ 91.32 74.28
(1)+(2) to residents 66.27∗∗∗ 94.91 59.32∗∗∗ 64.35 75.74
(1)+(2) non-performing 1.99∗∗∗ 6.88 1.19∗∗∗ 0.81 3.71
Other assets 8.68∗∗∗ 29.92 13.01∗∗∗ 9.29 19.50
Private deposits (3) 82.27∗∗∗ 65.47 74.30∗∗∗ 69.73 69.92
Interbank funds (4) 8.71 8.50 12.11∗∗∗ 16.90 11.26
(3)+(4) in foreign currency 88.92∗∗∗ 79.39 91.94 92.49 86.53
(3)+(4) from residents 72.62∗∗∗ 92.82 48.74∗∗∗ 39.07 66.89
Other liabilities 4.55 4.31 5.93 6.44 5.27
Equity 3.65∗∗∗ 20.01 6.98∗∗∗ 6.17 12.37
a The sample period goes from 01/1998 to 12/2001 and includes 29 banks and 1225 observations. The
numbers for end-2001 are sums over all (or particular) banks and in billions of national currency. The
balance sheet ratios are weighted averages (by total assets). These averages have been tested on
difference across (1) private and public banks, and (2) branches and subsidiaries using linear regressions.
(∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance on the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Table 6: Description of variables used in the regressions
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Argentina
NPL ratioit 2543 10.61 12.61 0.00 99.28
Dummy branchit 2543 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Sizeit−13 1964 13.23 1.68 9.60 16.30
Capitalit−13 1961 19.19 18.45 1.37 99.05
Liquidityit−13 1964 5.75 4.04 0.00 28.47
FX loans, residentsit−13 1964 48.57 11.91 0.72 98.09
Loans, non-residentsit−13 1728 4.29 7.15 0.00 49.78
Loans interbankit−13 1964 24.22 20.33 0.00 91.54
Subordinated debtit−13 1964 0.72 1.45 0.00 9.89
For the robustness checks
Dummy nameit 2547 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dummy advancedit 2547 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Dummy branchit*advancedit 2547 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Dummy branchit*sizeit−13 1964 7.40 6.52 0.00 16.26
Uruguay
∆NPL ratioit 1136 0.32 1.80 -9.11 28.17
Dummy branchit 1163 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
∆Sizeit−2 1084 0.01 0.12 -2.57 1.85
∆Capitalit−2 1076 0.07 2.34 -29.23 61.02
∆Liquidityit−2 1074 0.04 3.03 -42.16 49.70
∆FX loans, residentsit−2 1084 0.01 1.96 -10.28 14.22
∆Loans, non-residentsit−2 1080 -0.26 5.04 -79.84 37.47
∆Loans interbankit−2 1084 -0.14 5.02 -79.94 39.26
∆Subordinated debtit−2 1084 -0.002 0.24 -2.72 2.51
For the robustness checks
Dummy nameit 1164 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Dummy advancedit 1164 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Dummy branchit*advancedit 1164 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Dummy branchit* ∆sizeit−2 1164 0.002 0.10 -2.57 1.85
a The sample period is 01/1995-12/2001 for Argentina and 01/1998-06/2002 for Uruguay. In the case of
Uruguay, we worked with the first difference version. ’NPL ratio’: non-performing loan ratio as a
percentage of total loans; ’Dummy branch’: equal to 1 when a bank operates with a branch and 0 when it
operates with a subsidiary; ’Size’: logarithm of total assets; ’Capital’: equity-to-asset ratio; ’Liquidity’:
liquid assets ratio as a percentage of total assets; ’FX loans, residents’: foreign-currency loans granted to
residents as a percentage of total assets; ’Loans, non-residents’: loans granted to non-residents as a
percentage of total assets; ’Subordinated debt’: ratio of subordinated debt over total assets (for Uruguay
measured by the category ’Other liabilities’; ’Dummy name’: equal to 1 when the headquarter and
outpost share the same name and zero otherwise; and ’Dummy advanced’: equal to 1 when the
headquarter originates from a major advanced economy and zero otherwise; bank operates with a branch
and 0 when it operates with a subsidiary.
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Table 7: Regression results for the baseline specification: Argentina
Dependent variable GLS-(i) IV-(i) GLS-(ii) IV-(ii)
NPL ratioit Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
NPL ratioit−12 0.39∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
Constant 11.82∗∗∗ 6.15∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 6.00∗∗∗
Dummy branchit -3.46∗ -1.46∗∗∗ -3.51∗ -0.72∗∗
Controls
Sizeit−13 -1.41∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -1.81∗ -1.02∗∗∗
Capitalit−13 -0.13∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Liquidityit−13 -0.05 -0.25∗∗∗
FX loans, residentsit−13 -0.07 -0.05∗∗
Loans, non-residentsit−13 -0.04 0.02
Loans interbankit−13 -0.07∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
Subordinated debtit−13 -0.71∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗
Other controls
Time fixed effects in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗
Summary statistics
R2 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.57
Endogeneity (p-val) 0.23 0.29
Observations 1959 1915 1726 1696
Number of banks 40 40 40 40
a The sample period goes from 01/1995 to 12/2001. ’IV’ refers to the Instrumental variable (2SLS)
estimator, and ’GLS’ to the random-effects GLS estimator. Robust standard errors are reported. ’R2’:
overall coefficient of determination (GLS) and adjusted coefficient of determination (IV). ’Endogeneity’:
p-value of the robust score test of endogeneity with a null of exogeneity (only IV). (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗):
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 8: Regression results for the baseline specification: Uruguay
Dependent variable GLS-(i) IV-(i) GLS-(ii) IV-(ii)
∆ NPL ratioit Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆ NPL ratioit−1 0.21∗∗∗ 0.56∗ 0.17∗ 0.01
Constant 0.72∗∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.69∗
Dummy branchit -0.39∗∗∗ -0.20∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗
Controls
∆Sizeit−2 -0.45 -0.38 -1.56∗ -1.58
∆Capitalit−2 -0.12∗∗ -0.13∗∗
∆Liquidityit−2 -0.01 -0.02
∆FX loans, residentsit−2 -0.03 -0.04
∆Loans, non-residentsit−2 -0.01 -0.01
∆Loans interbankit−2 -0.03 -0.03
∆Subordinated debtit−2 0.05 0.05
Other controls
Time fixed effects in∗∗∗ in in∗∗∗ in∗
Summary statistics
R2 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.05
Endogeneity (p-val) 0.35 0.81
Observations 1084 1084 1062 1062
Number of banks 26 26 26 26
a The sample period goes from 01/1998 to 06/2002. ’IV’ refers to the Instrumental variable (2SLS)
estimator, and ’GLS’ to the random-effects GLS estimator. Robust standard errors are reported. ’R2’:
overall coefficient of determination (GLS) and adjusted coefficient of determination (IV). ’Endogeneity’:
p-value of the robust score test of endogeneity with a null of exogeneity (only IV). (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗):
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 9: Robustness checks
Argentina Uruguay
Dependent variable: NPL ratiot ∆NPL ratiot
IV-(iii) IV-(iv) IV-(v) IV-(iii) IV-(iv) IV-(v)
Key coefficients
Constant 7.07∗∗∗ 6.76∗∗∗ 6.77∗∗∗ 0.88∗ 0.91∗ 0.91∗
Dummy branchit -0.70∗∗ 0.58 0.62 -0.17 -0.30∗ -0.39∗
Dummy nameit 0.22 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05
Dummy advancedit -1.63∗∗ -0.93 -0.88 -0.20∗ -0.34∗ -0.33∗
Branch*advancedit -1.70∗∗ -1.80∗∗ 0.33 0.34
Branch*sizeit−n 0.08 -1.03
Other controls
Bank controls in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗ in∗ in∗
Time fixed effects in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗∗∗ in∗ in∗ in∗
Summary statistics
R2 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.04 0.05 0.05
Endogeneity 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.79 0.78 0.78
Observations 1696 1696 1696 1062 1062 1062
Number of banks 40 40 40 26 26 26
a The sample period goes from 01/1995 to 12/2001 in the case of Argentina and 01/1998 to 06/2002 in
Uruguay. The dependent variable is the NPL ratio with an AR-term of n = 12 in Argentina and the
first-difference of the NPL ratio with n = 1 in Uruguay. Only the key coefficients are reported. ’Bank
controls’ indicated that the bank-level regressors of model (ii) are included (size, capital, liquidity, FX
loans-residents, loans non-residents, loans interbank, and subordinated debt). The estimations are done
by Instrumental variable (2SLS) estimator. Robust standard errors are reported. ’R2’: adjusted coefficient
of determination. ’Endogeneity’: p-value of the robust score test of endogeneity with a null of
exogeneity. (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗): Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Figure 1: Host country regulator’s and parent bank’s preferences
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’Size’ indicates the size of the outpost in percent relative to the parent bank. Difference in the default probability
of subsidiaries and branches: (1 − q(m∗S)) − (1 − p)(1 − q(m∗A)). Difference between the expected profits of the
branch and parent bank and those of the subsidiary and the stand-alone parent bank: ΠA(m∗A)− (ΠS(m∗S) + ΠP ).
Figure 2: Decomposition of incentive effects
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’Size’ indicates the size of the outpost in percent relative to the parent bank. RHS: optimal monitoring intensities
m∗i for branches (i = A) and subsidiaries (i = S). LHS: the three incentives effects as a percentage of the average
sum of the incentive effects.
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Figure 3: Structure of assets and liabilities
Funding Lending
−200 −100 0 100
bil. pesos
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
 
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
Peso, residents Peso, non−residents
FX, residents FX, non−residents
(a) Argentina
Funding Lending
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200
bil. pesos
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
 
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay
Peso, residents Peso, non−residents
FX, residents FX, non−residents
(b) Uruguay
a
aIn billions of national currency, at year-end. ’Lending’ includes outstanding customer loans and interbank lend-
ing, and ’Funding’ includes deposits and other interbank obligations. ’Peso, residents’ indicates the amount of lend-
ing (funding) to residents in national currency, while ’FX, non-residents’ indicates lending (funding) to non-residents
in foreign currency. The data for 2002 include the effects of the exchange rate devaluations on FX positions.
Figure 4: Evolution of deposits from 2001 to 2003
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aIn billions of national currency. ’Deposits’ include deposits from the non-financial sector. The vertical lines
indicate the months of devaluation and banking holidays in Argentina (01/2002) and Uruguay (07/2002). Prior to the
devaluation the exchange rate (peso per dollar) was 1:1 in Argentina and 18:1 in Uruguay.
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Figure 5: Number of banks by ownership and corporate form
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Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
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(b) Uruguay
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Figure 6: Deposit shares (percent of total deposits) by ownership and corporate form
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Expressed in percentage points relative to the banking sector’s deposits
Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
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(b) Uruguay
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